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Abstract
This paper analyzes within a spatial endogenous growth setting the impact of pub-
lic policy coordination on agglomeration. Governments in each of the two symmetric
regions provide a local public input that becomes globally effective due to integration.
Micro-foundation of governmental behavior is based on three different coordination
schemes: autarky, full or partial coordination. Scale effects act as agglomeration
force and in addition to private capital agglomeration increase the concentration of
the public input. Integration promotes dispersion forces with respect to the distri-
bution of physical capital which are based on decreasing private returns. However,
within the governments’ decision on the concentration of the public input, increasing
integration reinforces agglomeration because it promotes the interregional productive
use of the public input. Taking feedback effects between the private and the public
sector into account leads to mutual reinforcement, hence agglomeration forces almost
always dominate and the spreading equilibrium becomes unstable. If convergence is a
separate (additional) political objective, it needs sustained additional political effort.
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1 Motivation
Reducing economic disparities has been a declared policy goal of the European Union
(EU) since its founding treaties (compare Article 174 of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the EU). The main instruments for achieving convergence include integration and (pol-
icy) coordination, and the EU also provides significant resources within the Structural
and Cohesion Funds. Usually, per capita income is used as an indicator for determining
(output)-convergence. Andersen et al. (2018) show that the EU has succeeded in approach-
ing the convergence objective in the period 1995–2008 but since the sovereign debt and
financial crisis economic divergence has again increased. However, what exactly coordi-
nation means and what the consequences of (lack of) coordination are for convergences is
still poorly understood.
At a global level, sustained growth and ongoing spatial concentration of economic activ-
ity have been going hand in hand since the emergence of the industrial revolution. Today
per capita income is higher in big cities, leading provinces and industrialized nations than
in remote regions. This pattern holds almost independent from national and supranational
policies. Naturally, public policies are designed to spur private sector activities. and to
increase overall economic productivity. Productive public spending is then, alongside in-
novation or education, a major growth determinant, and the co-evolution of growth and
spatial concentration is a natural outcome of market incentives and public policy.
Figure 1: relationship between public and private sector activity as displayed by the ratios of income
per capita and total general government expenditure share (EU28 average serves as benchmark to
calculate the respective national position); EU28 countries without LUX and IRL, including Iceland
and Norway; reference year: 20187; data from eurostat; own calculations.
A positive correlation between public expenditure and private production can be seen
in Figure 1 which plots for the EU 28 states their relative position w.r.t. the EU 28 average
both concerning income per capita (in ppas) and public expenditure, the latter referring to
’total general government expenditure’. Seen through this lens, private and public sector
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activity seem to act as complements which spur each other. Private investment is directed
into regions which allow for the highest productivity and spatial concentration of economic
activity is a natural outcome of market incentives (e.g. due to local increasing returns to
scale). Integration in the sense of free and unhindered capital flows is a prerequisite for
this to happen. As a consequence, existing disparities may be perpetuated or even increase
thereby undermining the convergence goal.
Broken down by functions, however, it becomes clear that the positive correlation
between private and public sector activity does not generally hold (compare Figure 2 for
selected ).1 This requires a closer look at the type of public input provided.
(a) public order and safety (b) health
(c) housing and community amenities (d) education
Figure 2: 2018 public expenditure for selected functions and and income per capita in ppp (EU28
countries without LUX and IRL, including Iceland and Norway); data from eurostat; own calculations.
Within the funding peroid 2014–2022, the EU spends almost half of its budget (47%)
on only two programs, namely Economic, Social and Territorial Cohesion (34%; 371 bn ¤)
and Competitiveness for Growth and Jobs (13%; 142 bn¤), (European Commission, 2020).
This money is spent to enhance human well-being (’consumptive governmental expendi-
1Compare Appendix 9.1 for an overview on first and second order public expenditure associated to
functions based on the classification of functions of government (COFOG) system.
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ture’) and private sector productivity (’productive public expenditure’). The overall goal
is to reduce regional economic disparities.
In addition to fiscal instruments, the EU also utilizes institutional economic policy
instruments to pursue the convergence objective. Based on experience from the financial
and sovereign debt crisis, the "European Semester" has been established by the European
Commission in 2010. This framework is a consultation and coordination process between
member states of the European institutions and targets in particular on the coordination
of central macroeconomic policy areas. The associated policy coordination process aims to
raise awareness of cross-border European implications of national policies.
Regarding converngece, all these facets will only be effective if the regions are con-
nected in some way. There has been a long standing academic debate on the impact of
integration on convergence. Integration is a prerequisite for transmission and spillovers
across (administrative) borders. Related to this, the role of governmental tasks (functions)
and the ’optimal’ size of the state sector have been discussed.
Both, integration and coordination do not act isolated concerning convergence but also
size and structure of public expenditure play important roles. Besides, when thinking about
the equalization of living standards across nations one has to consider that convergence
implicitly incorporates a spatial component. Additionally, local governments have to decide
if and to which extent they want to coordinate their policies at a global level - be it
expenditure or institutional rules. Related to this, especially the interregional transmission
channels and how these interact in the context of private and public sector activity are of
interest within the paper at hand.
These empirical observations together with the arguments provided before are the start-
ing points of the paper at hand. Within the framework of a spatial growth model with
productive government spending, we discuss the effects of different policy coordination
schemes on the resulting [(un)equal] spatial distribution of economic activity - or in other
words on convergence. Formally, and assuming full symmetry concerning factor endow-
ment, technology and behavior of the private and public agents, the convergence goal
could be understood as the realization of a spreading equilibrium in which individuals
of any region have identical incomes. In doing so we extend the theoretical literature in
several ways. Starting point is a two-region growth model with two local governments
that provide a productive input which is complementary to private capital. Private indi-
viduals invest in the most productive region. Integration transforms the two local public
inputs into a global public input which maybe accessed (at least partially) by the private
individuals independent of the firm’s location and opens up transmission channels. The
implementation of a congestion function allows to differentiate the public input according
to the functional classification of government expenditure with the idea to validate the
model’s implications on the basis of concrete data.
We interpret the coordination intensity of national expenditure policies as the extent to
which transmission and spillover effects are taken into account by national policy-makers
when deciding on state budgets. In analogy to the related theoretical literature, we in-
terpret the term ’policy coordination’ as a situation where – e.g due to well-designed
incentives, institutional rules, or political agreements – the two countries move away from
individual Nash policies to a joint policy that internalizes (at least some) cross-border
externalities. Compared to isolated policy decisions, usually the outcome is then Pareto
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superior. In doing so we implement micro-foundation of two local governments and analyze
how their strategies affect the distribution of economic activity in growing economies.
With regard to the convergence objective, we go beyond the mere analysis of its achieve-
ment. Formally put, we go beyond analyzing the existence of a spatial equilibrium which
we define as a situation in which private individuals are indifferent as to the region in which
investment will be realized. Instead, we are particularly interested in the stability proper-
ties of such a target and how it is influenced by different coordination schemes. These are
not only driven by the respective setting, but especially by the interaction between private
and public actors. In doing so we bridge the literature on public economics, growth theory,
and New Economic Geography.
Our principal findings can be summarized as follows. First, not only the existence but
especially uniqueness, stability characteristics and the resulting degree of spatial concen-
tration incorporate important insights. Given full symmetry (concerning factor endowment
and governmental behavior) spreading is always a resulting spatial equilibrium though the
stability characteristics are ambiguous. In case of asymmetric public power (i.e. given
partial coordination) a core-periphery structure results with the leading region represent-
ing the core. Other things being equal, convergence will never be achieved. Allowing for
feedback effects between optimizing private and public agents has a destabilizing impact
on the spatial equilibrium and these are the key driver of divergence. Put differently,
stability characteristics of the spatial equilibrium change dramatically if feedback loops
between private and public sector activity are taken into account. Second, not only the
size but also the type of public expenditure is crucial for the resulting spatial equilibrium
and its stability characteristics. Of special importance is the interplay of integration and
coordination for convergence. The model allows for a differentiated understanding of the
underlying cross-border transmission effects. Third, also from a technical perspective the
model is interesting. Although the formal model framework is a neoclassical two-region
growth model, the model type has central characteristics, which can also be found in mod-
els of New Economic Geography. These include multiple equilibria, cumulative causation
and bifurcation. Therefore, the model is well suited to combine the various theory fields.
Finally, our model is able to comply with empirical findings concerning governmental ac-
tivity differentiated by functions and private sector activity. Against the background of the
convergence objective, the result of our theoretical analysis is sobering. Convergence nei-
ther is a natural outcome of market forces nor can it be achieved in a setting where both
public and private agents perpetually interact based upon optimization considerations.
This holds for almost all coordination schemes and reasonable parameter constellations
with the sole exception of very specific conditions: a public input with low scale effects,
a high degree of integration and full coordination of national expenditure policies. One
solution to this sobering results can be that for specified functions the governments commit
themselves to a fixed budget. Given this, the declining marginal returns of further private
capital accumulation have a stabilizing effect. In other words: the steady hand of the state
is needed here.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. After presenting the theoretical
framework in Section 3 we discuss the spatial distribution of the local public inputs for three
different coordination schemes in Section 4. We derive the consequences for agglomeration
in Section 5. Section 6 addresses the feedback effects between private and public decisions
and their consequences for the spatial equilibrium. Section 7 summarizes and discusses
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the model’s policy implications while Section 8 briefly concludes. Formal derivations are
relegated to the appendix.
2 Related literature
The paper at hand relies on several key building blocks. The political and scientific dis-
cussion on spatial (in)equality is closely related to the convergence debate which addresses
the relative welfare position of a country. From a perspective of growth theory, the two
mostly employed concepts are the so-called β-convergence, which applies if poor coun-
tries tend to catch up to rich ones in terms of per capita income, while σ-convergence
focuses on cross sectional comparisons (Barro and Sala-I-Martin (2004):chap. 11 for de-
tails on both concepts and more literature). The paper at hand maybe directly linked
to the concept of β-convergence (Sala-I-Martin (1996a), Sala-I-Martin (1996b), Barro and
Sala-I-Martin (1992), Chatterjee (2005) or more broadly Islam (2003)).
In political terms, the so-called convergence objective of the EU aims to establish
equality of living conditions across all member states. Therefore, the EU has not only
implemented the Maastricht criteria which are fundamental with regard to the common
currency. In addition, the recent EU governance has established the European Semester
as well as the Stability and Growth Pact as key instruments for economic and fiscal policy
coordination. Related, Mortensen (2013) focuses on the distribution of power between var-
ious institutions, e.g. between the European Commission and the European Parliament.
Recent overviews and assessments of the current state of EU convergence have been pro-
vided by European Commission (2017), Dolls et al. (2018), Andersen et al. (2018) or Franks
et al. (2018).
The addressed policy coordination concepts lay ground for an analysis that focuses on
the microfoundation of local government behavior in a spatial context. We discuss three
different plicy coordination concepts that may be linked to the work of Hamada (1979)
who analyzed within a game-theoretic context the interaction between national economic
policy makers thereby contrasting non-cooperative Nash or Stackelberg outcomes with
those achieved by cooperation (compare also Miller and Salmon (1985), Hamada and
Kawai (1997) or McKibbin (1997) (empirical perspective) and the references therein).
However, most of the literature on macroeconomic policy coordination focuses on exchange
rates and monetary interdependence and thus on the associated implications of and for a
monetary union. Just as old is the discussion about the necessity of a fiscal union, i.e. the
establishment of a common European budget. Note that the discussion of the relationship
between fiscal and monetary union is beyond the scope of the paper at hand.
Instead, we analyze the effects of different types of coordination of national budgets
(allowing also for full coordination and hence a joint budget) on the associated public input
(size and type) – and link these considerations to economic convergence. Related to this
perspective, Ostry and Ghosh (2013):p. 4 point out that "Coordination works by allowing
countries to improve the policy trade-offs they face under autarky". The authors also
propose the implementation of a neutral assessor (one might think about a ’social planner’)
who may bridge divergent views of national policy makers and thereby internalizes at
least some of the arising externalities coming along with public good provision. However,
it should be noted that the effect of coordination cannot be seen independently of the
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depth of integration of the various countries. Key arguments of cross-border spillovers
and / or cross-border transmission effects of policies are discussed by Benes et al. (2013)
while Grüner (2013) raises potential problems related to not well-functioning coordination
processes.
Other key issues of the paper at hand are the size of the public budget and its type, i.e.
the way the budget is spent thereby addressing the use of government expenditure. His-
torical data on government expenditure has been provided e.g. by Lindert (1994). More
data sources together with arguments related to government expenditure broken down by
function, across countries and time can be accessed at Ortiz-Ospina and Roser (2020).
They also point to two observations that appeared simultaneously across time and also
worldwide: a continuously growing public sector size as well as a shift of funding priorities
from defense (in war periods) to social security. Today, aside from social security funds,
spendings on health and education dominate public expenditure in most OECD countries.
Theoretically it is possible to derive the optimal size of the government based on efficiency
considerations Barro (1990) points on the role of the expenditure share as a reasonable indi-
cator. Farhad and Jetter (2019) propose an explanation of when and why (trade) openness
may systematically affect the size of government. A differentiated perspective on the type
of input can be captured theoretically via the application of a congestion function (com-
pare Edwards (1990)2, Bradford, Malt, and Oates (1996), Eicher and Turnovsky (2000) or
more closely related to geographical economics Henderson (1974), Brakman et al. (1996)
or more recently Hirte, Lessmann, and Seidel (2020)). Empirically, this is represented by a
breakdown of government expenditure by functions they perform.3 The different functions
mirror "the main priorities and challenges of governments. [. . . ] Also common goals set by
regional agreements (such as OECD-EU countries) on energy, infrastructure and research
and development programs are all reflected in the structure of government’s expenditure."
(OECD (2015a):p. 72).
To better understand the spatial distribution of economic activity and the emergence
of core-periphery structures is the key concern of the New Economic Geography (recent
overviews based on the work of Krugman (1991, 1995) are provided by Fujita, Krugman,
and Venables (2001), Brakman, Garretsen, and Marrewijk (2009) and several contributions
in the Handbook of Regional Science (Fischer and Nijkamp, 2014)). Within this literature,
only few papers focus on public activity in the context of regional inequality and if so, they
implement transport cost reducing infrastructure (among them Martin and Rogers (1995)
or Brakman, Garretsen, and Marrewijk (2002)). The public input then unequivocally rein-
forces regional inequality. One exception is Puga (2002) who highlights that the provision
of a productive input might even act as dispersion force given certain characteristics of the
public input and integrated regions. Important characteristics of the New Economic Ge-
2He proposes to consider the non-public nature of a local public good.
3See Appendix 9.1 or e.g. Annex C in OECD (2015b) which provides an overview of first- and second-
level classification of functions of governments (COFOG). The academic literature differentiates between
productive expenditure (sum of expenditure on education, health, defense, housing and community ameni-
ties, economic affairs, general public services - which aim to enhance private sector productivity) and
non-productive government expenditure (sum of expenditure on public order and safety, recreation and
social protection - which focus on individual well-being), compare Adam and Bevan (2005), Bleaney, Gem-
mell, and Kneller (2001), Park (2006), Christie (2012) or Gemmell, Kneller, and Sanz (2016). However,
we argue that public order and safety also have productivity impact which is especially important in the
context of foreign direct investment.
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ography’s core model are cumulative causation, the possibility of multiple equilibria with
ambiguous stability characteristics and the potential to be non-optimal. Finally, there is in-
teraction of agglomeration and trade flows. Key drivers that shape the economic landscape
are imperfect competition, increasing returns, and transportation costs. Spatial inequality
is then the natural outcome of efficiency consideration of optimizing private individuals.
A broader discussion of the role of regional institutions have been provided e.g. by Deeken
and Ott (2014) or Brakman, Garretsen, and Marrewijk (2009):pp. 461–470.
These building blocks are the basis for the mode lat hand. Within a two-country
growth model we investigate how the provision of productive public expenditure affects
the emergence and the stability characteristics of the spatial equilibrium for three different
policy coordination schemes.
3 Theoretical framework
We assume a two region setting populated by private individuals and governments that
provide local public inputs.4 Firms in the symmetric regions produce the homogenous final







i , 0 < λ,α, γ < 1, i = 1, 2 (1)
with Li as immobile labor and Ki as physical capital in region i. The global public input,
Di, covers access to both regional public inputs, Gsi, and is modeled as
D1 = Gs1 + βGs2 (2a)
D2 = Gs2 + βGs1 (2b)
The degree of integration between the two regions is parameterized by β ∈ [0, 1].5 It
may be interpreted as the extent to which the two local public inputs become globally
effective: If β = 0, firms in each region only utilize the public input provided by their
local governments. In contrast, β > 0 implies that firms in one region also have (partial)
access to the other region’s public input. For a broad specification of the public input,
integration may e.g. be interpreted as increasing the flows of ideas between two regions, as
connecting national physical infrastructure networks, the recognition of foreign degrees or
joint defense (e.g. Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) argue similarly).
We specify the regional public input analogous to the congestion function concept
introduced by Edwards (1990) and adopted by Eicher and Turnovsky (2000). It may
be associated with various types of congestion and scale such that the services that an
individual firm gets out of the utilization is specific to the public input. Being more precise,
the services derived by the individual firm in region i from government expenditure in the






K̄εAi , 0 ≤ εR ≤ 1, −α ≤ εA ≤ 1 (3)
4Compare Barro (1990) for the baseline model in a one region context.
5Note that in some simulations the domain of β is restricted to β ∈ (0, 1) for technical reasons.
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where K̄i denotes the aggregate stock of private capital, and analogously Gi denotes the
aggregate flow of government expenditure.6 We assume non-distortionary financing of the
public expenditure, the absence of interregional transfers and in each period a balanced
public budget.7
The congestion function (3) incorporates the potential for the regional public good to
be associated with alternative degrees of absolute congestion, denoted by εA, or relative
congestion, denoted by εR. Concerning relative congestion, εR, the usual interpretation
applies. It measures the degree of rivalry arising in the utilization of the public input:
εR = 0 specifies a public input that is available as pure public good (e.g. an empty and toll-
free road) whereas the other polar case, εR = 1, implies that each firm only benefits from
1/N parts of the public input with N denoting the number of firms.8 This specification
of the congestion function also allows to link the model (via εA) to empirical data on
governmental activity as captured within the COFOG classification and discussed in the
introduction of this paper.
Since in equilibrium K̄i = NiKi applies
gs = gk
εAnεA−εR (4)
defines the equilibrium ratio of governmental activity gs ≡ Gs1Gs2 , with k ≡
K1
K2
, g = G1G2 and
n ≡ N1N2 .
We extend the congestion function specification of Eicher and Turnovsky (2000) such
that we do not restrict the sign of εA, to be negative, but also allow for positive values.
This allows linking our perspective to the interpretation of spillovers as developed by
Romer (1986) while negative values of εA may be associated to public inputs which have a
strong local public impact (such as e.g. public order and safety or community and housing
amenities). The productivity effects from the public input are related to the size of the
private sector as measured by the aggregate private capital stock, K̄.
The interpretation of εA may be associated with its sign. For εA < 0, the well recognized
absolute congestion applies. The associated logic is that rivalry w.r.t. the public input
reduces private capital productivity. The effect of negative εA, absolute congestion, in
this sense is rather similar to the one of relative congestion. In contrast, εA > 0 includes
arguments of endogenous growth as established by Romer (1986). Other things being
equal, private capital returns are higher in case of a positive εA. In the following we call
the associated impact scale effects. As will be shown subsequently, scale effects are a crucial
determinant of agglomeration.
We apply the usual assumption that governments set the aggregate expenditure levels,
6Allowing for balanced growth requires that the condition α + εA ≥ 0 has to be satisfied. It results
from the knife-edge assumption α+ γ(1 + εA) = 1 that has to be met to allow for equilibrium endogenous
growth. The formal setup of the underlying growth model is presented in Appendix 9.4.
7Note that this implies symmetrically balanced budgets. Ott and Soretz (2010) briefly discuss the
impact of distortionary income taxes within a two-region baseline model.
8Notice that throughout the discussion of this paper we focus on the implications of scale, εA, and
integration, β, thereby assuming a certain degree of relative congestion ε̄R > 0 in order to confine the
input from a pure public good that is characterized by the absence of rivalry.
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Gi, as a constant fraction, Θi, of aggregate capital, K̄i, such that9
Gi = ΘiK̄i, 0 < Θi < 1 (5)
An expansion in government expenditure is then parameterized by an increase in the capital
share, Θi. Together with 4,
gs = θk
1+εAn1+εA−εR (6)
defines the equilibrium ratio of governmental activity, with θ ≡ Θ1Θ2 . This ratio together
with the specification of Di from (2) are key and provide the basis for rich interdepen-
dencies between the private sector (as embedded in private capital, k) and the public
sector (as especially captured by public capital, θ, scale, εA, and integration, β). Utilizing











Our spatial equilibrium concept is based on private and public optimization decisions.
In Section 4, the governments optimize for a given distribution of private capital, for-
mally θ(k). In Section 5, the private individuals optimize for a given distribution of the
public input, formally k(θ). Within Section 6, these two perspectives are merged such that
the resulting equilibrium involves mutual interaction between the private and the public
optimization decisions.
4 Strategic governmental behavior
In this section, we analyse the the local government’s decision on the amount of the local
public input and show that relative governmental activity is driven by private capital dis-
tribution, θ = θ(k). Due to integration, any local government’s decision also affects the
global public input, Di. As a consequence, regional public decisions become globally ef-
fective regarding private capital productivity and thus drive private investment incentives.
Efficiency considerations require to equalize marginal productivity and unit marginal costs
of providing the public input. While marginal costs for the public input are easy to deter-
mine, marginal productivity in a two-region setting is affected by various factors, among
them the degree of integration, the type of the input as modeled via the congestion pa-
rameters εA and εR, thereby reflecting e.g. spendings for infrastructure, health, education,
or housing and community amenities.11
The coordination schemes discussed below imply different public decision rules, and
these are key to the resulting spatial distribution of economic activity. The following
9Note that this is in line with considering the expenditure share or the stylized fact of Kaldor (1961)
of a constant capital coefficient.
10The relative perspective immediately allows to identify spatial concentration in region 1 if the value
of the considered factor exceeds unity.
11Note that the public input is modeled as a flow. We thereby follow Barro (1990) who imposes the public
efficiency condition dY/dG = 1 representing the assumption that one unit of output can be transformed
costlessly into one unit of capital or into expenditure for the public input.
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arguments come into play. First, global production amounts to Y = Y1 + Y2, but the local
governments do not necessarily focus on aggregate but rather on local output. Second, there
are two governments that decide upon the provision of the respective local public input.
Basically, since both local public inputs imply the same cost, local public expenditure
might be exchanged for each other, G = G1 +G2. We show that, although this relationship
generally holds, the way it is considered in decisions of the local governments is crucially
affected by the underlying coordination scheme. Third, there are interregional transmission
effects due to integration. The decision of a region on the local public input affects capital
productivity – and thus private investment incentives – also in the respective other region.
Besides, integration allows for shifting productivity between the regions.
From a firm’s perspective in e.g. region 1 the ’global’ public input is given by D1 =
Gs1 + βGs2, which implies that integration, scale, and congestion interact. Therefore, the
decision about where to install the ’local’ public input becomes a non-trivial task for the
governments and may serve as a basis for strategic behavior.
Starting point to analyze the institutional impact is whether and to which extent these
various relationships and feedback effects are taken into account by the local governments.
The following coordination schemes of the two governments will be addressed:
1. full coordination: this setting assumes joint decision of both governments thereby
taking the actually existing regional interdependencies into account. The focus is
on joint output (Y = Y1 + Y2), and both governments correctly recognize that local
public expenditure may perfectly substitute for each other (G = G1 +G2) such that
dG1 = −dG2 applies. In this setting, local public investments will be allocated as
to equalize productivities of the local public inputs thereby considering aggregate
production, Y (compare (8)).
2. no coordination: this setting assumes that, although there are interregional economic
interdependencies, the other region’s policy is treated as being exogenous to the
decisions of an optimizing local public agent. This implies that the two public inputs
are not considered as potential substitutes, and the focus of each government is on
local output, Y1 and Y2, only (compare (15)). Consequently, the provision of a public
input in one region becomes an externality for the other region’s government.
3. partial coordination: this setting assumes a leading and a following region. The
leading region’s politician is quite aware of the decisions of the (myopic) follower
region that just optimizes as in case of no coordination. Again, only local output
Y1 and Y2 is addressed by each region independently (compare (20)–(22)). The
interdependencies between the two local public inputs are in part being internalized
by the leader – though not with the intent to maximize welfare but own interest of
the leading region.
It will be shown that independent of the chosen coordination scheme, the spatial equi-
librium is shaped by the interaction of three effects: a positive complementarity effect,
a negative substitution effect and an ambiguous integration effect. However, depending
upon the coordination scheme, differences in the optimal expenditure share ratios result.
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4.1 Full coordination
Full coordination is equivalent to the perspective of a benevolent social planner. The
associated public efficiency condition in case of fully coordinated public policies assumes
that the regional governments simultaneously focus on aggregate output, Y = Y1 +Y2, and
















Shifting public expenditure between the two regions implies dG1 = −dG2 while equalizing
marginal costs to marginal productivity is given by ∂Y∂G1 =
∂Y
∂G2
= 1. For the production




























Replacing them into efficiency condition (8) and utilizing proportionality according to (5)
provides G1 = θnkG2. This implies dG1dθ = nkG2 and −
dG2
dθ = nkG2, and one obtains the








This relationship determines the size of the public input ratio θ∗ implicitly. The explicit
representation of θ∗ may be derived by utilizing equations (3), (6) and solving (10) for θ










, Υ ≡ k1+εAn1+εA−εR (12)
Figures 3(a)–3(c) plot θ∗(k) for selected parameter constellations of scale (εA) and
integration (β).12
If the regions are symmetric (l = n = 1), the right hand side in (10) equals unity. The
spreading equilibrium applies and independent of scale and integration, θ∗ = k = 1 results:
Using (6), the optimality condition (10) reduces to
gs + β
1 + βgs
= 1 ⇒ gs = 1 ⇒ θ∗(k) = 1 (13)
In the spreading equilibrium, efficient government expenditures will also be equally dis-
tributed across the two regions (compare the intersection of the dashed and the solid
function in Figures 3(a)–3(c)).
12Notice that in Figure 3(c) the negative value εA = −0.05 has been chosen to illustrate that the positive
slope of the functions θ∗(k) is not linked to the sign of the scale parameter. Instead, the interaction between
integration and scale are decisive. For εA > 0 the slope of θ(k) is unequivocally positive.
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Figure 3: θ∗(k, . . . εA, β . . . ) based on equation (11) for selected values of integration and scale;
other parameters: l = 1, n = 1 (which implies no impact of εR), α = 0.5.
Now we are prepared to focus on the more realistic case that private capital is unequally
spread across regions. In the following, we will define the region with the larger capital
stock to be region 1, hence unequal capital distribution is equivalent to k > 1. Jointly
optimizing governments will adjust the ratio θ∗ based on three major effects which will be
explained below. In order to calculate the adjustment in θ∗, one has to notice that both
gs at the left hand side as well as the term on the right hand side in (10) are functions of
















(1 + βgs)−γ(1− γ)(1− β2)gs




The sign of (14) and thus the reaction of public activity across space on concentrated
private capital distribution is indeterminate (compare Figures 3 and 4).
If private economic activity is concentrated, k > 1, optimal public activity will also be
concentrated though not necessarily in the bigger region 1. For sufficiently low εA (compare
Figure 3(a)), the negative effects incorporated in equation (14) dominate such that private
activity in the larger region substitutes for public activity. Put differently, in order to
dampen productivity losses due to negative scale of the public input, public expenditure is
shifted from the larger to the smaller region. As a consequence θ∗ declines as k increases.
This negative effect is reinforced by integration (compare dashed line). For sufficiently
high (though not necessarily positive) levels of scale, the positive effects in (14) dominate
and θ∗ increases in k. Scale effects in the public input increase productivity in the larger
region, hence public expenditure is redirected from the smaller to the larger region. Again,
integration reinforces this relationship (compare Figure 3(c)). For intermediate levels of
13For a formal derivation of the total effect broken down by the three partial effects (complementarity,
substitution, integration), compare Section 9.3.1 in the Appendix.
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scale (compare Figure 3(b)), however, integration has an ambiguous impact: other things
being equal, reducing the degree of integration then turns the dominance of the negative
effects to a dominance of the positive effects.
The total effect within (14) originates from three different sources that describe the
relationships between gs, θ and k:
First, a positive complementarity effect arises between θ and k, given in the first line of
equation (14). If the private capital distribution is concentrated (i.e. for k > 1), produc-
tivity of the public input increases relatively more in the larger region due to the better
endowment with physical capital and the complementarity of private and public capital.
Other things being equal, expenditure for the public input will be shifted towards the
larger region in order to equalize the marginal productivities of the two local public in-
puts. As a consequence, the distribution of the public input becomes more concentrated
as well, θ∗ increases. To give an example, in the metropolitan area, there is more need
for infrastructure, hence the associated government share should be higher in the larger
region.
Second, there is a negative substitution effect between θ and k, given in the third line
of equation (14). Due to proportionality (remember equation (5)), the actually available
amount of the public input, Gs, is larger in the region with higher aggregate capital.
Consequently, for any expenditure share, θ, the concentration of the public input, gs,
increases with k > 1 (compare (6)). In order to obtain a certain level of governmental
services, private capital may be reduced reacting on the increase in public input. Put
differently, stronger concentration of the public input (higher θ) c. p. induces a negative
substitution effect on the concentration of the private input and vice versa. As can be seen
in the second line equation (14), this effect is independent of integration, β, whereas its
strength size unequivocally increases with the value of εA.
Third, there are ambiguous effects due to integration, given in the second line of equa-
tion (14). The integration effect captures the governments’ awareness of the possibility to
shift public expenditure back and forth between the two regions. The sign of εA determines
the direction of the integration effect: If scale effects are positive, εA > 0, any increase
in k augments the effective amount of the public input in the larger region.14 Integration
provides (partial) access also to the remote public input and allows for interregional sub-
stitution between local public expenditures. To enable private firms to benefit from the
scale effects, government expenditure is shifted from the smaller to the larger region – and
the resulting productivity impact is then taken back to the ’home’ region via integration.
Other things being equal, θ∗ increases. Contrariwise, if congestion in the sense of negative
scale effects applies, i.e. if εA < 0, an increase in k reduces the effective amount of the
public input in the larger region. A shift of government expenditures from the larger to
the smaller region then lowers the scale disadvantage and results in a decrease in θ∗.15
For the the spreading equilibrium, k = 1, visual representations of the partial effects
can be seen in Figures 4 for alternative combinations of β ∈ (0, 1) (vertical axis) and
εA ∈ (−0.4, 1) (horizontal axis). For the mentioned parameter settings, the strength
14Formally, this can be derived by introducing the equilibrium condition K̄i ≡ NiKi into (3) which then
reduces to Gsi = GiNεA−εRi K
εA
i .
15Notice that the sign of εA determines the direction of the integration effect only but not necessarily
the sign of the total effect.
13
(a) negative substitution effect (b) positive complementarity effect
(c) ambiguous integration effect (d) ambiguous total effect
Figure 4: dθ∗(k, . . . εA, β . . . )/dk from (14) for k = 1; three partial effects and ambiguous total effect
in case of full coordination depending upon integration (vertical axis) and scale (horizontal axis); total
effect is sum of three partial effects; horizontal axis: εA ∈ (−0.4, 1); vertical axis: β ∈ (0, 1), other
parameters: l = 1, n = 1 (which implies no impact of εR if n = 1), α = 0.5; plots are based on
equations (42)–(44); colorbars document effect strength (color intensity) and sign (blue: negative;
red: positive).
of each effect and its sign is documented in the colorbars. Notice the ambiguity of the
integration effect: for εA > 0 it strengthens the positive complementarity effect, whereas
εA < 0 reinforces the negative substitution effect. Concerning the substitution effect, for
given values of εA, the degree of integration does not matter.
The sign of the total effect of dθ∗/dk depends upon the interaction of the three partial
effects. It is ambiguous in case of full coordination and crucially driven by the strong inte-
gration effect. If congestion applies (εA < 0), the integration effect is negative: increasing
concentration of private capital, k, reduces the productivity of public services in the larger
region and induces a shift of public expenditures towards the smaller region. This shift is
more pronounced in case of stronger integration (higher β) since the larger region can ben-
efit more easily from the public services provided in the smaller region. Hence, a negative
total effect will results for high values of integration and low values of εA.
Contrariwise if scale effects apply (εA > 0), the integration effect is positive: increasing
concentration of private capital in this case enhances the productivity of public services in
the larger region. Public efficiency requires a shift of public expenditure towards the larger
region and the shift again will be more distinct in case of high values of integration.
To sum up, agglomeration will be reinforced by governmental decisions whenever the
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total effect is positive, hence predominantly for scale effects and strong integration. If
instead the public input is characterised by absolute congestion (and again integration
is strong enough) such that the total effect is negative, governmental decisions reduce
concentration and and result in a dispersion force.
As will be shown in the two subsequent Sections 4.2 and 4.3, all three effects also hold
for partial and no coordination though to different extents. As a consequence, the resulting
total effects also differ between the coordination schemes.
4.2 No coordination
If each region decides autarkic on the level of own public expenditure, the local governments
consider the public input of the respective other region as exogenous factor such that the
option to exchange between local public expenditure is neglected, −dG1/dG2 = 0. The
same applies concerning the contribution of local output, Yi, to aggregate output, Y .
Autarkic local optimization assumes regionally disconnected efficiency considerations that
amount to equalizing the marginal productivities of the local public inputs independently.
























Due to the incomplete consideration of the interregional interdependencies, the (non-
considered) productivity impact of integration becomes an externality. Completely un-








Utilizing equations (3), (6) and solving (17) for θ provides the explicit representation of θa
as
θa(k, εA, β, . . . ) =
Ω− β
(1− Ωβ)Υ





and Υ from (12). Figures 5(a)–5(c) plot θa(k) for selected parameter constellations of εA
and β.
The interdependency between private and public sector is as follows. If both regions
are symmetric, l = n = 1, and spreading of private activity applies (i.e. k = 1), the
16This setting corresponds to the Cournot-Nash duopoly.
17Notice that compared to marginal productivities in the planner setting in equations (9a) and (9b), the
integration term is missing.
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(a) εA = −0.2: positive effect
dominates
(b) εA = 0: positive effect dom-
inates
(c) εA = 0.2: positive effect
dominates
Figure 5: θa(k, . . . εA, β . . . ) based on equation (18) for selected values of integration and scale;
other parameters: l = 1, n = 1 (which implies no impact of εR), α = 0.5.
right hand side of equation (17) is unity and the uncoordinated solution implies equally
distributed government expenditure. This result relies on the assumption of symmetric
factor endowment such that both regions symmetrically disregard the productivity impact
of their public input on the respective other region. Both governments, although they
neglect the option to shift public expenditure back and forth between the two regions
and thus choose ’suboptimal’ levels of expenditure, deviate with their decision to the same
extent from the planner optimum. Consequently, since the externality is also symmetric, it
cancels from a relative perspective. In case of spreading, θa(k) = 1 results (which coincides
with θ∗(k) = 1 in the case of coordinated policies, compare equation (13)). This result
also holds independent of scale or integration – as can again be seen in the intersection of
dashed and solid functions in Figures 5(a)–5(c).
If in contrast private activity is concentrated, i.e. if k > 1 is realized, public expenditure















Again the total effect results from the interaction of the aforementioned three partial ef-
fects: complementarity, substitution and integration effect. While the substitution effect
does not differ from the planner setting, the ambiguous integration effect is less distinct in
the uncoordinated setting. Since both governments only consider the productivity impact
of public services arising in their own region, the shift of public expenditure building on
integration is less pronounced. Integration effect and complementarity effect add up to
the first summand in equation (19) which is unequivocally positive. Especially in case of
negative values of scale, the integration effect does not longer dominate the total effect
(compare Figure 6 for a visualization of the partial effects). Although the sign of εA deter-
mines which effect (complementarity or substitution) is being reinforced, the integration
effect looses its dominance for the total effect.
As can be seen in Figure 5, for reasonable parameter settings, altogether the positive
relationships between private and public input dominate. The ambiguity of the total effect
discussed for coordinated policies disappears. In the absence of coordination, a rise in k
unambiguously increases the productivity of the public input prioritizing the larger region.
Hence the government expenditure share in the larger region increases more rapidly than
16
(a) negative substitution effect (b) positive complementarity effect
(c) ambiguous integration effect (d) positive total effect
Figure 6: dθa(k, . . . εA, β . . . )/dk from (19) for k = 1; partial effects and ambiguous total effect in
case of autarky depending upon integration (vertical axis) and scale (horizontal axis); total effect is
sum of three partial effects; horizontal axis: εA ∈ (−0.4, 1); vertical axis: β ∈ (0, 1), other parameters:
l = 1, n = 1 (which implies no impact of εR if n = 1), α = 0.5; plots are based on equations (42), (48),
and (49); colorbars document effect strength (color intensity) and sign (blue: negative; red: positive).
in the smaller region, θa increases. The relatively larger region will then also be endowed
with relatively more public input. As a consequence, uncoordinated government decisions
on the public input unambiguously amount to an agglomeration force.
4.3 Partial coordination
Aside from the polar scenarios of full and no coordination it is also quite natural to think
about economies in which the large region’s government behaves as a ’Stackelberg-leader’
who anticipates the behavior of the follower. For instance, if a metropolitan area provides
a university, the neighboring small city will discard to supply a university itself which
affects the investment incentives of the large region. Or, if one city decides to close some
museums, the other city will consider to amplify its cultural environment. We assume such
a leader-follower setting in which the leading region 1 and the following region 2 behave
differently. More precisely, the smaller region 2 takes the amount of the larger region’s
public input as given and reacts on it optimally. Exploiting this behavior, the leading
region relegates (at least part of the) expenditure to the (remote) follower region.
Formally, the larger region 1 anticipates the behavior of the smaller region 2 and chooses
the amount of the public input subject to the constraint that region 2 will adjust its public
17
input accordingly. Given these assumptions, the decision rule of the follower region 2 is
analog to the uncoordinated policy as derived in Section 4.2 and consists in equalizing






2 = 1 (20)
Marginal productivity of G2 is affected by the amount of the public input in region 1, G1,
since this enters the follower region’s global public input, D2, if integration prevails, i.e. if
β > 0. Hence, public expenditure in the follower region 2 is adapted to the observed amount
of G1 such that condition (20) is fulfilled. The smaller region 2 adjusts its expenditure























Due to integration, an increase in the public input in region 1 induces an increase in the
global public input which is available in region 2, D2. The associated decrease of marginal
productivity leads to a reduction in the chosen amount of public input in region 2, G2.
This effect is larger the more pronounced the integration and the larger the scale effects
in the public services. However, the leader region 1 anticipates this reaction of follower
region 2 within its own optimization. When calculating the marginal benefit of public
input, region 1 takes into account that the public input of region 2 will be the lower, the
higher the amount of the public input of region 1. Put differently, the government in
region 1 calculates both the positive direct and the induced indirect replacement effect and
equalizes the associated marginal product to the marginal costs. The optimization rule of




























The right hand side of (23) exceeds the right hand side of equation (17) describing the
uncoordinated solution. Hence, the left hand side has to be higher too, which implies a
lower value of θs compared to the uncoordinated setting. The larger region 1 anticipates
the reaction in the public input of region 2, hence it decreases its local expenditure. As a
consequence, other things being equal, the ratio of public inputs, θs < θa for all levels k >
1.18 Accordingly, partial coordination in the leader-follower-setting serves as a dispersion
force compared with the uncoordinated setting due to the restraint in public expenditure
of the larger region. This holds for all parameter constellations, except for β = 0 where
θs = θa = θ∗.
The explicit representation of θS(k) may be derived by utilizing equations (3), (6) and
solving (23) for θ as
θS(k, εA, β, . . . ) ≡
Λ− β
(1− Λβ)Υ
, where Λ ≡ ((1− β2)kεAnεA−εRkαlλ)
1
1−γ (24)
18Compare also equations (18) and (24).
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and again Υ from (12).19
(a) εA = −0.1: positive effect
dominates
(b) εA = 0: positive effect dom-
inates
(c) εA = 0.1: positive effect
dominates
Figure 7: θS(k, . . . εA, β . . . ) based on equation (24) for selected values of integration and scale; other
parameters: l = 1, n = l (which implies no impact of εR), α = 0.5. Notice that for n = l = k = 1 no
symmetry results but θS < k
Figures 7(a)-7(c) plot θs(k) for selected parameter constellations of εA and β. Even in
case of full symmetry, i.e. if n = l = k = 1, θs unequivocally falls below unity.20 The leading
region anticipates the effort of the smaller region and pursues a beggar-thy-neighbor policy.
The arising level of θs decreases with integration, β, and increases with scale, εA (compare
Figure 7). Put differently, equalized public activity (θs = 1) only results if private capital
is concentrated in the bigger region 1 (i.e. if k > 1). This effect is reinforced by integration
which facilitates the access to the other region’s public input.
If the starting point is not the spreading equilibrium but private capital is concentrated
(k > 1), regional governments’ decisions on the amount of public expenditure will be driven















As in the uncoordinated setting, the positive complementarity effect and the ambiguous
integration effect sum up to the first term which unambiguously is positive: concentration
in private capital ceteris paribus increases concentration in public expenditure. Figure 8
shows that for reasonable parameter settings, this positive effect dominates the negative
substitution effect.
Private capital concentration implies that there is more need for public services in
the larger region. This positive effect on θs is larger in the partial coordination setting
than with uncoordinated policies, since the larger region takes the reaction of the smaller
region into account. Any increase in public expenditure of region 1 immediately decreases
government activity in region 2 (see negative sign in (21)). If region 1 is a Stackelberg
leader, it will compensate for this reduction and increase public input even more. The
total effect results to be positive for all reasonable parameter settings and even stronger
19Note that reasonable values of θs may only be derived for restricted domains of εA and β. Figure 14 in
the Appendix gives a graphical representation of valid parameter constellations (the red area – where θs >
0).
20Compare also the matrix plot in Appendix 9.2.
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(a) negative substitution effect (b) positive complementarity effect
(c) ambiguous integration effect (d) positive total effect
Figure 8: dθS(k, . . . εA, β . . . )/dk with partial effects as derived in equations (42), (52), (53) and θS
from (24) for k = 1⇒ θS < 0; partial effects and ambiguous total effect in case of autarky depending
upon integration (vertical axis) and scale (horizontal axis); total effect is sum of three partial effects;
horizontal axis: εA ∈ (−0.4, 1); vertical axis restricted parameters: β ∈ (0, 0.5), other parameters:
l = 1, n = 1 (which implies no impact of εR if n = 1), α = 0.5; plots are based on equation (42), (52)
and (53); colorbars document effect strength (color intensity) and sign (blue: negative; red: positive).
than for uncoordinated policies. Hence, the agglomeration force resulting from partial
coordination is stronger, too.
As a consequence of θs < 1 = k, the negative substitution effect varies for given levels
of εA with β. Its absolute value decreases with integration and increases with scale. Other
things being equal, it is more pronounced the higher εA and the lower β.21
5 Private sector optimization
We now shift the perspective from optimizing local governments to optimizing private firms
that interpret the spatial distribution of public activity as given.22 Formally spoken, we
focus on k∗(θ̄).
Following Bröcker (2005) we argue that investment in physical capital is spatially mobile
across the regions such that capital accumulation is realized in the region delivering the
21An overview of the impact of integration and scale effects on the signs of the partial effects compared
for the three coordination schemes can be found in Table 2 in Appendix 9.3.4.
22This section strongly borrows from Ott and Soretz (2010). . The expenditure share ratio θ̄ is based
on (5) together with the definition of θ ≡ Θ1/Θ2, thus affecting private capital productivity and hence
individual investment decisions. Notice that the assumption of the exogenous level of θ̄ neglects feedback
effects between private and public optimization decisions. We turn to this point in Section 6.
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higher marginal returns. Within a two-region setting, the ratio of marginal productivities




A spatial equilibrium is defined as a stationary capital distribution which requires R = 1,
with non-negative investment in both regions. Then firms are indifferent as to invest either
in region 1 or 2, agglomeration and dispersion forces cancel.23 Implementing equations (1)–








α(gs + β) + γεRgs
α(1 + βgs) + γεR
)
(27)
Taking logarithms of (27) leads to the relationship
R ≷ 1 ⇐⇒ i(k, θ̄, . . . ) ≷ −λ ln l (28)
with i(k, θ̄, . . . ) representing the productivity (or return) differential between the regions
given by







α(gs + β) + γεRgs
α(1 + βgs) + γεR
)
(29)
The distribution of governmental activity, θ̄, enters this term via gs. Together with
the spatial distribution of immobile labor, reflected by the threshold −λ ln l from (28), it
determines the direction of investment flows.24 If the productivity differential exceeds the
threshold, capital is more productive in region 1 such that k increases until the spatial equi-
librium condition is met at the intersection of i(k) and the horizontal axis (representing the
threshold for l = 1) in Figure 9(a). Analog arguments apply for productivity differentials
falling below the threshold.
In line with the argumentation in geographical economics, for symmetric regions, ag-
glomeration forces destabilize a spreading equilibrium while dispersion forces have a sta-
bilizing impact. Other things being equal, either a unique and stable spatial equilib-
rium or multiple equilibria with different stability characteristics arise. Both scenar-
ios are illustrated in Figure 9(a) for the case of completely symmetric regions (i.e. if
n = l = k = θ = 1).
23Since the basic framework assumes a growth model, the full description of the spatial equilibrium is
characterized by regional capital stocks growing at constant rate. The corresponding growth model is
presented in Appendix 9.4.
24The threshold −λl is independent of k and θ and coincides with the horizontal axis if immobile labor
is equally distributed across space, i.e. for l = 1. An increase (a decrease) in the ratio of immobile labor, l,
shifts the horizontal line downwards (upwards) and thereby affects the equilibrium concentration of private
capital. This again is a complementarity effect between production factors: An increase in immobile labour
in one region rises capital productivity in this region. Beyond the spreading equilibrium, R > 1 involves
agglomeration forces that foster concentration. In contrast, R < 1 induces dispersion. Immobile factors
ensure the permanent existence of two regions. This might be interpreted in analogy to the no-black-hole
condition discussed within models of the New Economic Geography (compare e.g. Brakman, Garretsen,
and Marrewijk (2008)).
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(i) If i(k, θ̄, . . . ) is monotone and negatively sloped in k = 1 (compare the solid line
in Figure 9(a)), the spreading equilibrium is unique and stable. For any unequal capital
distribution k 6= 1 the region which is endowed with more physical capital will experience
smaller capital return. Hence, capital investment is directed to the smaller region until
spreading is realized. The solid line is exemplary for specific combinations of integration
and scale representing stable spreading and the corresponding parameter constellations
can be found within the white area in Figure 9(b).
(ii) If instead, i(k, θ̄, . . . ) is non-monotone, multiple equilibria with different stability
characteristics arise (compare the dashed line in Figure 9(a)). Then the agglomeration
forces dominate around the spreading equilibrium k∗ = 1 making it unstable. Instability
implies that deviations from it induce investment in the more productive larger region.
Dispersion forces gain importance when the disparity increases and induce a stable core-
periphery equilibrium k∗∗ > 1.25 The stable equilibrium is reached when capital produc-
tivities are again equalized and R = 1 applies at k∗∗ > 1.
(a) i(k, θ̄, . . . ) from (29); parameters: β = 0.2,
dashed line: εA = 0.5, solid line: εA = 0.1.
For l = 1 the horizontal axis represent the
threshold −λl = 0 from 28.
(b) (in)stability of spreading depending upon
integration and scale for exogeneous θ̄: The
blue line represents the bifurcation line ac-
cording to (30); white area: spreading is sta-
ble; shaded area: spreading is unstable; εA
at horizontal axis and β at vertical axis
Figure 9: Equilibrium agglomeration and (in)stability of spreading; symmetric factor endowment:
θ̄ = k = n = l = 1 , other parameters: α = 0.5, εR = 1.
In case of complete symmetry (θ = k = n = l = 1), it is possible to derive a closed
form solution for the underlying bifurcation, i.e. to derive those parameter combinations
of congestion, scale, and integration that separate stable from unstable equilibria. From
a technical perspective, the crucial characteristic is the sign of the slope of i(k, θ̄, . . . )
from (29) evaluated at the equilibrium capital distribution, k∗ = 1. This may be derived
by zeroising the first derivative of i(k, θ̄ . . . ) w.r.t k, setting k = 1 and solving for β which
provides the bifurcation function in (30).
25The notion of a core-periphery relies on the seminal work of Krugman (1991).
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β̄ ≡ εR(α+ εA)− α(1 + εA)
α(1 + εA)
(30)
Figure 9(b) plots β̄(εA) for α = 0.5 and εR = 1. For β > β̄, the spreading equilibrium is
stable (white area in Figure 9(b)) whereas for β < β̄, spreading is unstable. Put differently,
for εA larger than determined in (30), the core-periphery equilibrium will result (shaded
area) and for smaller εA, the spreading equilibrium will be stable.
Again, scale effects (εA > 0) can be recognized as agglomeration force: capital return
increases in the capital stock and capital is more productive in the larger region. This
effect can be seen in Figure 9(b). The shaded area representing core-periphery equilibria
is completely located in the area where εA > 0.
Integration (β > 0) in contrast is a dispersion force: due to integration the smaller
region can benefit from any productivity advantage taking place in the larger region. Other
things being equal, in Figure 9(b) more pronounced integration implies moving upwards
and eventually leads into the white area representing spreading equilibria.
In Section 6 we show that for a huge variety of parameters, public coordination activities
strengthen agglomeration forces thereby imposing a destabilizing impact on the spreading
equilibrium.
6 Feedback effects as drivers of regional inequality
So far, feedback effects between decisions of the private and the public sector have been
neglected. Section 4 analyzes optimization considerations of public actors for a given
distribution of private capital while Section 5 considers private investment decisions for
a given distribution of public activity. Feedback effects, however, arise since private and
public sector are interdependent and this may activate processes of cumulative causation
(as visualized in Figure 10). As will be shown below, feedback effects mostly destabilize
the spreading equilibrium. Note that this result is in line with what we observe worldwide
concerning ongoing urbanization which seems to apply independent of the institutional
setting.
In this section we derive how the stability characteristics of the spreading equilibrium
will be affected if feedback effects apply. Again, we assume full symmetry and especially
focus on the impact of the bifurcation parameters integration and scale.26 Starting point
is the spreading equilibrium, k = 1.
As in Section 5, we focus on the concept of the spatial equilibrium based on equations
(26)–(28) but we now replace the so far exogenous ratio θ̄ by those levels that have been
explicitly determined by the two governments within the different coordination schemes in
Section 4, i.e. by θ∗(k) from equation (11), θa(k) from (18) and θs from (24).27
26Considering bifurcation as derived in (30) highlights that also relative congestion acts as bifurcation
parameter. The simulations as well as Figures 9(b) and 12 assume εR = 1.
27As a consequence, the return differential i(k, θ(k) . . . ) from (29) can be reformulated to only depend
upon k.
23
Figure 10: mutual interdependencies, feedback effects, and cumulative causation
As a reference, Figures 11(a)-11(d) plot the return differentials without feedback effects
to be compared to those setting in which feedback effects are taken into account, compare
Figures 11(e)-11(p). Recall that the slope of the return differential function, i(k), in the
spreading equilibrium reflects the associated stability characteristics.
In the reference scenario, spreading is stable with the single exception of high scale
effects and low integration (compare dashed line in Figure 11(a)). If instead one allows for
full coordination (compare Figures 11(e) - 11(h)), the stability characteristics of spreading
change dramatically. Now spreading is only in one single case stable, namely if there is
congestion (negative scale) and integration is high (compare the dashed line in Figure 11(g)
and more broadly the filled area in Figure 12). Key driver of this result is the integration
effect as derived in Section 4.1. Only for high integration and low scale, and only in
case of full coordination, the dampening integration effect is strong enough to keep the
spreading equilibrium stable. In case of no coordination (compare Figures 11(i)–11(l)), the
integration effect is weaker and altogether spreading unequivocally gets unstable. In case
of partial coordination (Figures 11(m)–11(p)), an unequivocally unstable core-periphery
equilibrium exists with the leading region representing the core. The size of the core is
larger for high levels of integration and decreases with the level (though not the absolute
value) of scale.
For the planner setting, Figure 12 highlights how the range of the bifurcation parameter
constellations of β and εA leading to an unstable spreading equilibrium is extended if
feedback effects are taken into account. Similar to Figure 9(b), the shaded areas represent
combinations of integration and scale leading to unstable spreading equilibria. The basic
pattern that can be seen in case of exogenous θ persists and even gets reinforced, while the
basic mechanism remains: increasing scale and/or decreasing integration destabilize the
spreading equilibrium. In any case, coordination effects strengthen agglomeration forces.
A closer look at the two benchmark cases of no coordination and full coordination helps
to understand the reason for the prevailing instability. One key result is the emergence
of the positive externality that the provision of a public input by one region represents
for the respective other region in case of no coordination.28 Related to this is the fact
that the negative substitution effect then unequivocally is dominated. Besides, we argued
that the direction of the integration effect depends upon the sign of scale, εA. It basically
allows for a positive relationship between the private and the public sector (thus reinforcing
the complementarity effect) if εA is positive whereas the integration effect reinforces the
negative substitution effect, if εA is negative.
It is possible to derive the described effects more broadly and thus to discuss whether
28Note that an externality also arises in case of partial coordination. However, the subsequent discussion
only compares no coordination and full coordination.
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(a) θ̄ = 1, β = 0.2 (b) θ̄ = 1, β = 0.2 (c) θ̄ = 1, β = 0.35 (d) θ̄ = 1, β = 0.35
(e) θ = θ∗, β = 0.2 (f) θ = θ∗, β = 0.2 (g) θ = θ∗, β = 0.6 (h) θ = θ∗, β = 0.6
(i) θ = θa, β = 0.2 (j) θ = θa, β = 0.2 (k) θ = θa, β = 0.6 (l) θ = θa, β = 0.6
(m) θ = θS , β = 0.2 (n) θ = θS , β = 0.2 (o) θ = θS , β = 0.35 (p) θ = θS , β = 0.35
Figure 11: productivity differential for selected values of β(= 0.2, 0.35, 0.6) and εA(= −0.1, 0, 0.5)
and for various coordination schemes (θ̄ = 1, θ∗, θa, θS).
Figures 11(a)-11(d) neglect feedback effects (i.e. consider θ = 1 as exogenous and constant, i(k|θ̄ = 1))
Figures 11(e)–11(h): full coordination, (i(k|θ∗));
Figures 11(i)–11(l): no coordination, (i(k|θC));
Figures 11(m)–11(p): partial coordination, (i(k|θS))
connecting perspective for all scenarios is given by εA = 0 (red line – which is included in all subfigures)
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Figure 12: (in)stability of spreading depending upon integration and scale for endogenous θ∗; white
area: spreading is stable; shaded area: spreading is unstable; shift of bifurcation line from solid to
dashed, if feedback effects are taken into account (recall: solid line is identical to Figure 9(b)); grey
shaded area: instability area planner without feedback effects, gets extended if feedback effects are
taken into account – red shaded area on top; εA at horizontal axis and β at vertical axis separating
stable and unstable spreading equilibria; other parameters: n = l = k = 1, α = 0.5.
concentration of government expenditure in the uncoordinated setting ends up to be higher
or lower than for coordinated policy. To do so, formally one might start by comparing the






l−λk−α ⇔ kεAnεA−εR ≷ 1 (31)
The result mainly depends on the characteristics of the public input as captured by εA. If
scale effects are positive (εA > 0), agglomeration (k > 1) implies kεA > 1. For n near or
equal to 1, nεA−εRkεA > 1 follows immediately, and the upper inequality signs in equation
(31) apply. Hence the right hand side in equation (17) is larger than in (10). Contrariwise,
if scale effects are negative (εA < 0), agglomeration implies nεA−εRkεA < 1 and therefore
the right hand side in equation (17) is smaller than in (10). The left hand side in the

























This implies that the ratio of governmental activity is lower (higher) in the uncoordinated
setting than with coordinated policy if scale effects apply:
εA ≷ 0 ⇔ θa ≶ θ∗ (33)
The reason is the positive externality of the public input on the other region’s income
which becomes prevalent in the ambiguous integration effect. Both regions neglect this
positive effect, hence they underestimate marginal productivity of their public expenditure.
As a consequence, they realize a suboptimally low level of the public input. If there are
negative scale effects (εA<0), productivity in the smaller region exceeds productivity in the
larger region. Hence the resulting distortion is more pronounced in the bigger region (which
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(a) εA = −0.2 θa > θ∗: neg-
ative impact of integration
effect (red lines above the
black lines)
(b) εA = 0 θa = θ∗: no
action of integration effect
(red and black lines coin-
cide)
(c) εA = 0.2 θa < θ∗: positive
impact of integration effect
(black lines above red lines)
Figure 13: Comparing fully coordinated policies (black functions) and uncoordinated policies (red
functions); symmetric factor endowment n = l = 1; solid line: β = 0.25, dashed line: β = 0.5.
neglects a larger productivity impact in the smaller region). This leads to a suboptimally
low realization of θa. If instead there are positive scale effects (εA > 0), productivity is
lower in the smaller region and so is the distortion. Hence the resulting concentration of
government expenditure is suboptimally high. Figure 13 summarizes this and especially
demonstrates the ambiguous impact of the integration effect and how this is reinforced by
integration.
To conclude, whenever scale effects apply and there is integration (εA > 0, β > 0), the
optimal distribution of public input is characterized by concentration in the larger region:
k > 1 leads to θ∗ > 1. Increasing integration reinforces this effect because it promotes the
interregional productive use of the public input. With this reason, integration becomes
an agglomeration force with respect to the distribution of public input. If additionally
coordination is missing and regional governments decide autarkic, integration strengthens
agglomeration even if scale effects are absent. In the uncoordinated regime regions choose
a suboptimally high concentration of public input (see Figure 13(a)) and integration again
reinforces this effect.
7 Results and policy implications
In economies without feedback effects, i.e. θ̄ exogenously given and constant, compare Sec-
tion 5, the following applies: in case of full symmetry a stable spreading equilibrium results
for most combinations of integration and scale. Then, integration unequivocally acts as
a dispersion force with respect to the distribution of private capital: Even if scale effects
are high and set ground for agglomeration forces, a stable spreading equilibrium may be
achieved just by sufficiently increasing the degree of integration (compare Figure 9(b)).
For low integration, a stable core-periphery structure results (compare k∗∗ in Figure 9(a))
in which both regions grow at identical rates.29
In case of endogenous θ, the impact of integration on the stability of spreading is not
predetermined, compare Section 4. Instead it mainly depends on the characteristics of
29This scenario, however, implies divergence in terms of absolute income per capita.
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the public input. Scale effects (εA > 0) give rise to concentration of the public input and
integration reinforces this effect as it allows for the interregional productive use of the
public input. Integration acts as catalyst that reinforces either prevailing agglomeration
forces (thus destabilizing the spreading equilibrium) or dispersion forces (thus stabilizing
the spreading equilibrium). In any case, if dispersion forces are weak, the associated
reinforcement is also weak such that the spreading equilibrium remains unstable even if
the degree of integration is significantly increased.
If in addition feedback effects are taken into account, compare Section 6, the mechanisms
driving the spatial equilibrium are more complex and especially the stability characteristics
come to the fore. Notice that due to the complexity of the model, it is then only possible
to make statements in or close to the spreading equilibrium. Another influencing factor
aside from scale and integration is the underlying institutional setting (i.e. the coordina-
tion scheme). In this sense, comparing the settings without and with feedback effects,
integration is Janus-faced.
Feedback effects dramatically reduce those parameter combinations of scale and inte-
gration that allow a stable spreading equilibrium to result from market forces (compare
the respective white areas in Figures 9(b) and 12). The intuition is as follows. The inter-
action between private and public optimizing agents is crucial for the spatial distribution
of economic activity. Access intensity to the remote public input is driven by integration.
Private individuals invest in the region delivering the higher profitability of private capital
thereby assuming a certain endowment with public capital. Public agents, on their end,
assume a given distribution of private capital stocks and then decide upon the provision
of the public input based on efficiency considerations of the public investment. If the two
governments do not jointly decide, the positive productivity impact of the public input
in the respective remote region becomes an externality. Although perceived as being in-
dependent from the perspective of the actors, private and public decisions are mutually
interdependent thus setting ground for feedback effects.Taking feedback effects between the
private and the public sector into account induces a process of cumulative causation with
mutual reinforcements between the private and the public investment decisions. This is
key to the resulting spatial distribution of economic activity. It also dramatically changes
the stability characteristics of the spreading equilibrium in the following sense. Deviating
from the spreading equilibrium, any initial return differential will persist and perpetu-
ally drive a wedge between the local capital productivities. As as consequence, private
investment flows to the larger region thereby triggering concentration of public expendi-
ture which again reinforces concentration of private capital. As a result of the feedback
loops, agglomeration forces dominate for most combinations of integration and scale thus
destabilizing the spreading equilibrium. As soon as there is one region with a (slightly)
larger capital stock, this region’s government will decide to provide more public input such
that the productivity of private capital increases and the larger region attracts even more
capital. In case of feedback effects, integration forces are for almost any prevailing de-
gree of scale not strong enough to compensate the strong agglomeration forces. Finally,
state (power) asymmetries make it impossible to achieve spreading as a result of market
dynamics.
This result is in strong line with the worldwide empirical evidence of ongoing spatial
concentration of economic activity – independent of any institutional setting. Any existing
divergence continuously increases. At the same time it challenges the convergence goal of
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the EU.
The associated policy implications cover a variety of facets. The model makes it vividly
clear that even if the two regions are completely symmetric, the resulting spatial equilib-
rium is not necessarily stable. A policy aimed exclusively at convergence as such is therefore
not enough. On the contrary, any convergence policy must have the associated stability
impact in mind. The stability characteristics are determined by a variety of influencing
factors and their interaction, so such an accompanying policy is anything but trivial.
Where feedback effects take place between the private and public sectors, a precise
understanding of the (potentially ambiguous) effects of integration is required. A stabilizing
effect of the integration effect results in the case of expenditures for public goods, whose
productivity impact is very strongly materialized regionally, as for example in the case of
expenditures for public order and safety or housing and community amenities (formally:
εA < 0). The locality of the associated public good is thus essential. On the other
hand, government spending that is associated with high economies of scale (εA > 0)
induces agglomeration forces and destabilizes the spreading equilibrium. Regardless of
the public input, an increase in the degree of integration has the effect of strengthening
the respective effects. But since agglomeration forces almost always dominate, integration
strengthens this effect and will not become a game changer regarding the equilibrium’s
stability characteristics. Governments should be clear about the underlying transmission
channels.
Any policy aiming at convergence should take accompanying measures to stabilize
convergence. This is not automatically the result of market incentives. Alternatively, one
solution could be for states not to change their level of expenditure permanently, but to
keep it constant. In this case, declining marginal returns on accumulated private capital
would lead to a standstill of investment incentives as the capital stock rises, so that at
least a stable core-periphery structure can be achieved as a spatial equilibrium. Especially
in these times of increasing destabilization, it may even be explicitly opportune for the
international community to agree on the type and level of public input and not to regularly
revise these decisions. The important role would then be to be a reliable partner for the
optimizing private actors. Raising awareness for the complex interdependencies is thus a
of major importance for any local agent that decides upon the size of public input and the
function for which it is spent.
As already explained, the form of coordination determines the extent to which optimiz-
ing state actors internalize the interregional external effects from the provision of public
input in the other region. Full internalization only takes place in a full coordination set-
ting. The full coordination setting is also superior for welfare reasons. The reference for
a commonly agreed upon policy is the joint income (Y = Y1 + Y2), which is maximized
thereby taking into account G = G1 + G2. Neither Cournot nor Stackelberg setting take
this perspective into account. In the case of autarky, the decision-makers focus only on
regional income. In a leader-follower-setting it is of particular interest to what extent com-
panies in the leading region can benefit from the productive government spending of the
other region.
In any case, policy-makers must be aware that the simple proclamation and its pursuit
of the convergence objective falls short of the mark. The model has shown that convergence
can almost never be realized as a result of jointly optimizing public and private agents.
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Another important insight from the model, however, is that if the spreading equilibrium
is reached, its stability properties and the determinants of stability must be taken more
into account. The type of public input plays a central role here, as does the strength of
integration.
Finally, when choosing their governance structure, states should consider not only
the actual convergence objective but should especially also pay attention to the stability
characteristics of an associated equilibrium. However, if stability is a separate (additional)
political objective, policy makers must prioritize between the various objectives.
8 Conclusions
This paper combines major lines of public economics, growth theory, and New Economic
Geography. Our key contribution to the literature is the microfoundation of local govern-
mental policies and how these impact not only on the existence but the stability of the
spatial equilibrium which itself is the outcome of private investment decisions for given
institutional framework conditions.
In a nutshell: Governmental policies in such a framework cover various dimensions.
The degree of integration affects to which extent local public inputs become part of a
global public input thus having implications for productivity also in neighboring countries.
The type of the public input affects to which extent scale effects apply and if the public
input is (partially) congested. Finally, the way how coordination between the two regions
is organized, how feedback-loops between public and private agents work and subsequently
the relative size of the local public inputs also is crucial.
Policy issues cover the provision (type and size) of a productive public input, integra-
tion, and various regional policy coordination schemes. The latter predominantly address
efficiency considerations of macroeconomic policies from the perspective of local govern-
ments. Key arguments are the recognition of cross-border transmission effects in the light
of integrated economies as well as the interplay between private and public sector. Key goal
of the paper is to better understand whether economic convergence results by following
market incentives and under what conditions such a spatial equilibrium is stable. Special
attention is paid to the behavior of local governments. Motivated by several stylized facts
on government expenditure, income per capita and the observed worldwide increase of
urbanization rates we develop a theoretical model to disentangle the underlying complex
economic and political interdependencies. We differentiate the three settings of full coordi-
nation (comparable to a social planner’s perspective), full autonomy (i.e. governments that
decide completely independent from each other on the size of the respective local public
input) and the case of partial coordination (in which we assume the governments of the
two countries to behave as a leader and a follower in a Stackelberg duopoly). In doing
so, we provide a micro-foundation for governmental behavior in a spatial growth model
with a productive public input and discuss the implications for the spatial distribution
of private economic activity. We also address the stability characteristics for the different
coordination schemes and show that governmental coordination may destabilize the spatial
equilibrium. Endogenous determination of the public input thus strengthens agglomera-
tion forces and thereby sets ground for a process of cumulative causation which ends up in
ongoing spatial concentration. The model is thus well suited to explain the stylized facts
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of ongoing agglomeration processes, irrespective of the underlying institutional framework.
This result undermines equalization of living standards - at least as natural outcome of
market incentives. In addition, given the recent political instability we especially propose
that the governments should not only focus on the convergence goal as such but should
especially pay more attention on factors and market incentives that stabilize the spatial
equilibrium. Seen through this lens integration may become a game changer if the states
refrain from permanently adapting their public investment behavior.
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9 Appendix
9.1 Classificatin of functions of government (COFOG): Overview of di-
visions and groups
Government broad objective Sub-items
General public services Executive and legislative organs, financial and fiscal
affairs, external affairs; foreign economic aid; general
services; basic research; R&D related to general pub-
lic services; general public services n.e.c.; public debt
transactions, transfers of a general character between
different levels of government.
Defence Military defence; civil defence; foreign military aid,
R&D related to defence; defence n.e.c.
Public order and safety Police services; fire-protection services; law courts;
prisons; R&D related to public order and safety; pub-
lic order and safety n.e.c.
Economic affairs General economic, commercial and labour affairs;
agriculture, forestry; fishing and hunting; fuel and en-
ergy; mining, manufacturing and construction; trans-
port; communication; other industries, R&D related
to economic affairs; economic affairs n.e.c.
Environmental protection Waste management; water waste management; pollu-
tion abatement; protection of biodiversity and land-
scape; R&D related to environmental protection.
Housing, community amenities Housing development; community development; wa-
ter supply; street lighting; R&D related to housing
and community amenities; housing and community
amenities n.e.c.
Health Medical products, appliances and equipment; outpa-
tient services; hospital services; public health services;
R&D related to health; health n.e.c.
Recreation, culture and religion Recreational and sporting services; cultural services;
broadcasting and publishing services; religious and
other community services, R&D related to recreation,
culture and religion; recreation; culture and religion
n.e.c.
Education Pre-primary, primary, secondary and tertiary educa-
tion, post-secondary non-tertiary education, educa-
tion non definable by level, subsidiary services to ed-
ucation, R&D; n.e.c.
Social protection Sickness and disability; old age; survivors; family and
children; unemployment; housing; R&D; social pro-
tection and social exclusion n.e.c.
The Classification of the functions of government, abbreviated as COFOG, was devel-
oped in its current version in 1999 by the OECD and published by the United Nations
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Statistical Division as a standard classifying the purposes of government activities. Source:
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Glossary:
Classification_of_the_functions_of_government_(COFOG), accessed 10.07.2020.
9.2 MatrixPlot of θs
Note that θS unequivocally falls short of unity and even ngeative values of θS may be iden-
tified. This restricts the reasonable parameter constellations of the bifurcation parameters.
Table 1 presents the numerical values on which Figure 14 has been plot.
Figure 14: Matrix plot of θs based on Table 1 is based; vertical axis: β ∈ [0, 1], horizontal axis:
εA ∈ [−0.4, 1]
9.3 Total effect and partial effects of dθ/dk for all coordination schemes
9.3.1 Full coordination
Starting point is equation (10). Calculations of the partial effects via application of the










kεAnεA−εR − β︸ ︷︷ ︸
T1
· l−λk−α︸ ︷︷ ︸
T2
(34)
from (10). This approach holds analogously for all coordination schemes. The following
equation illustrates exemplary how the total effect may be subdivided into partial effects
in case of full coordination.
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Table 1: Numerical values based on θs from (24) and being displayed in the matrix plot in Figure 14;
negative values are replaced by "–"
β=0. β=0.1 β=0.2 β=0.3 β=0.4 β=0.5 β=0.6 β=0.7 β=0.8 β=0.9
εA=-0.4 0.999 0.913 0.658 0.283 – – – – – –
εA=-0.3 1. 0.948 0.785 0.501 0.147 – – – – –
εA=-0.2 1. 0.96 0.832 0.595 0.27 – – – – –
εA=-0.1 1. 0.966 0.856 0.646 0.344 – – – – –
εA=0. 1. 0.97 0.871 0.679 0.394 0.052 – – – –
εA=0.1 1. 0.973 0.881 0.702 0.429 0.093 – – – –
εA=0.2 1. 0.974 0.888 0.718 0.456 0.125 – – – –
εA=0.3 1. 0.976 0.894 0.731 0.476 0.15 – – – –
εA=0.4 1. 0.977 0.898 0.741 0.493 0.17 – – – –
εA=0.5 1. 0.977 0.902 0.749 0.506 0.187 – – – –
εA=0.6 1. 0.978 0.904 0.756 0.517 0.202 – – – –
εA=0.7 1. 0.979 0.907 0.761 0.527 0.214 – – – –
εA=0.8 1. 0.979 0.909 0.766 0.535 0.224 – – – –

























































(gs + β)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
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≷ 0 ⇔ εA ≶ 0 (39)
∂T2
∂k
= −α · l−λk−α−1 < 0 (40)
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9.3.2 No coordination: Cournot












· l−λk−α︸ ︷︷ ︸
T2
(45)












= identical to (41) (47)














≷ 0⇐⇒ εA ≷ 0
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(48)
positive complementarity effect: ∂T2∂k = −αl
−λk−α−1 remains unchanged. CE Cournot














9.3.3 Partial coordination: Stackelberg
Starting from (23) (recall: compared to Cournot and planner setting, valid parameter










negative substitution effect: is identical to planner (42) but now utilizing θS from (24)
−∂T1/∂gs · ∂gs/∂k
∂T0/∂gs · ∂gs/∂θ




ambiguous integration effect: analogous to Cournot but reinforced via scaling factor,







positive complementarity effect: analogous to Cournot but reinforced via scaling fac-







Thus, the strength of CE and IE are always stronger in case of partial coordination
(Stackelberg) compared to no coordianation (Cournot) while the effects’ direction is iden-
tical.
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IE ≶ 0⇔ εA ≶ 0 > 0 ≶ 0⇔ εA ≶ 0 > 0 ≶ 0⇔ εA ≶ 0 > 0
SE 0 < 0 0 < 0 < 0 < 0
CE > 0 < 0 > 0 < 0 > 0 < 0
TE ≶ 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0
Table 2: overview on sign of partial effects depending upon integration and scale if n = l = k = 1
and for θ∗ = θa = 1, θS < 1 (compare equations (11), (18) and (24)).
9.4 Underlying growth model
Preferences of the identical and infinitely living household include maximizing lifetime








σ e−ρtdt ρ > 0, 0 < σ < 1 (54)
The subjective discount rate is denoted by ρ, σ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitu-
tion, and Ci(t) describes consumption in region i.
Households save by accumulating a risk free asset. The asset value equals the value
of the stock of capital at any point in time; hence, the asset value in region i at time
t equals Vi(t) ≡ q1(t)K1i(t) + q2(t)K2i(t), where qi denotes the stock price of capital
installed in region i. The immobile workers earn labor income as well as capital income
from investment in both regions. Wages in region i are denoted by wi(t). The total income
in region i evolves according to
V̇i(t) = wi(t)Li(t) + (r(t)− δ)Vi(t)− Ci(t)− Ti(t) (55)
with r(t) denoting the interest rate determined in capital market equilibrium, δ as the
constant depreciation rate of private capital and Ti(t) a lump-sum tax that is used to




K1i(t)ξi(t) = 0 lim
t→∞
K2i(t)ξi(t) = 0 (56)
have to be met, where ξi denotes the shadow value of capital in region i. Maximizing (54)






σ e−ρt + ξi(wi(t)Li(t) + (r(t)− δ)Vi(t)− Ci(t)− Ti(t)) (57)
30The setup of the model mainly borrows from Ott and Soretz (2010).
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and leading to the well known growth rate of consumption as31
Ċi
Ci
= σ(r − δ − ρ) ≡ ϕ (59)
Households in both regions realize identical consumption growth, a direct consequence from
homothetic preferences together with equal investment opportunities. Moreover, due to
constant average returns of capital, the consumption-wealth ratio is constant and hence the
growth rates of consumption, capital and income coincide. An increase in capital return,
r, will increase the growth rate due to strengthened incentives for capital accumulation. In
contrast, an income tax would reduce net capital return and therefore decrease the growth
rate. It is well known from growth literature that a lump-sum tax Ti(t) is growth neutral,
since it does not influence capital return.
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